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It Takes More than Moore to Answer Existence-Questions
Abstract
Several recent discussions of metaphysics disavow existence-questions, claiming that they are
metaphysically uninteresting because trivially settled in the affirmative by Moorean facts. This
is often given as a reason to focus metaphysical debate instead on questions of grounding. I
argue that the strategy employed to undermine existence-questions fails against Quineanism,
its usual target. The Quinean can protest that the given formulation of their position is a straw
man: properly understood, as a project of explication, the Quinean project does not counsel us
to choose between obvious ordinary-language claims and absurd revisionist claims, even if
appeal to Moorean facts is permitted.
Recent work in metametaphysics has attempted to undermine what has been described as the
‘preferred  methodology’ (Manley  2009,  3)  for  dealing  with  ontological  questions  –  the
Quinean approach. There is much to be said about what exactly this approach is (or should
be),1 but  one  strand  of  agreement  is  that  for  the  Quinean,  ‘ontological  questions  are
quantificational questions.’ (Fine 2009, 158) That is, the primary interest of ontology is in
what we quantify over, or equivalently (for the Quinean), what there is, or what exists. For a
putative kind F, we can ask any of the following:
- Are there Fs?
- Do Fs exist?
- Is it the case that  ∃ x (Fx) ?
However, Kit Fine (2001, 2009), and following him Jonathan Schaffer (2009) and Kathrin
Koslicki (2012) amongst others envisage a serious problem with treating questions of this
form  as  central  to  ontology.  They  claim  that  for  almost  any  reasonable  candidates,  the
questions  resulting  from  their  substitution  into  the  schemas  above  seem  to  be  trivially
answerable in the affirmative. To take some typical examples of how to achieve these easy
answers:
Numbers
(1) There are prime numbers.
(2) Therefore, there are numbers.
Properties
(1) There are properties that you and I share.
(2) Therefore, there are properties.
The argumentative strategy here has been described by Schaffer as Moorean – in each case
the first statement is claimed to be a Moorean fact, ‘one of those things that we know better
than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary’ (Lewis 1996, 549),
whose  truth  establishes  the  conclusion  by  weakening  the  premise.  Contrariwise,  by
considering the question whether there are numbers, or propositions, the Quinean is enquiring
after  something  whose  falsity  would  entail  the  falsity  of  a  Moorean  fact.  But,  says  the
endorser of this strategy, it’s a Moorean fact! We are so confident that it  is a fact that no
argument to the contrary should convince us.
These examples in themselves do not show that the Quinean approach is  untenable.  The
central move for what I will call the  triviality argument generalises on these examples to
reason as follows: most questions of the form “Are there  Fs?” that the Quinean approach
regards as interesting can be answered by appeal to Moorean facts. They then claim that if a
question of the form “Are there  Fs?” can be answered by appeal to a Moorean fact, it  is
uninteresting, and therefore that most questions regarded as interesting by the Quinean are in
fact uninteresting. On the assumption that an approach is flawed if it seriously misrepresents
the questions it considers, the proponent of the triviality argument rejects Quineanism.
There are at least two simple ways that the Quinean might respond. First one might claim that
there is at least one substitution of  F for which no Moorean fact undermines the existence
question, but proponents of the triviality argument will be happy to issue the challenge and
wait  for  counterexamples.  If  one  is  proposed,  they  may  still  be  able  to  dissolve  it  by
uncovering a Moorean fact, but this is not required of them. They need not even hold that one
can never provide reasons to doubt a candidate, as they are content with a more limited thesis
that ‘one should be permissive about those very entities Quineans typically consider most
controversial’ (Schaffer 2009, 359). For instance, Fine admits that possible worlds may be an
exception to the triviality argument,  and Schaffer claims that putative entities will not be
amenable to Moorean existence-proofs if they contain the notion of fundamentality in their
definition, but neither regards these exceptions as undermining the strategy.
The second simple Quinean response is to insist that the Quinean approach gets ontology
right  but  just  concede that,  as  it  turns  out,  there aren’t  really  any interesting  ontological
questions.  Typically  defenders  of  the  triviality  argument  say  that  there  are  obviously
interesting ontological questions and we need to find a way to acknowledge this, so they go
on to articulate what has become known as “neo-Aristotelianism”, an approach that seats the
project  of  ontology in  questions  about  whether,  and  how,  entities  are  grounded in  other
entities. However versions of the triviality argument have been endorsed by philosophers
who would describe themselves as deflationists,2 who see the dearth of interesting ontological
questions as a welcome result.
There have been responses to the triviality argument. For instance Daly and Liggins (2014)
argue that nothing has been done to establish the Moorean status of the examples in the
triviality  argument,  and that  therefore we have no reason to think that  no countervailing
considerations  could  be  strong  enough  to  undermine  it,  however  strong  warrant  for  the
starting premise might be. I will not contribute further to criticism of that premise of the
triviality  argument  – I  will  instead grant  for the sake of  argument  that  the statements  in
question are Moorean facts. Nor am I interested in critiquing the neo-Aristotelian approach
that is offered to replace Quineanism, both because this would do nothing to respond to the
aforementioned deflationists and because there is already a large and complex literature on
that issue. I will instead criticise the formulation of the Quinean approach that has been used
to construct the triviality argument. By refusing to articulate the approach more clearly these
philosophers are able to ignore better ways of explaining things from the target perspective,
and when we clarify  the  Quinean approach a  way is  clearly  available:  in  particular,  the
Quinean can deny that it follows from the availability of an answer to “Are there  Fs?” by
appeal to Moorean facts that the question is uninteresting.
The  presentation  of  the  issue  by  proponents  of  the  triviality  argument  suggests  that  the
Quinean focus when asking ontological questions is on challenging, and possibly throwing
out,  putative  kinds.  Critiques  of  Quineanism  are  sometimes  phrased  as  critiques  of
“eliminativism”,3 with  an  attendant  focus  on  the  (il)legitimacy  of  eliminating  from  our
account entities that are identified as problematic. A simple picture of this endeavour would
show us starting with a list of apparent existents {F, G, H, I, J, …} and, suspicious of one of
these, seeking arguments against its existence that are strong enough to jettison it from the
list.  We eventually end up with a list at the end of enquiry such as  {F, H, J}. This is the
endpoint Schaffer describes when explaining that the Quinean conception of ontology is flat:
‘[t]he target of metaphysical inquiry is an unstructured list of existents.’ (2009, 355)
This is wrong. For the Quinean the target of metaphysical enquiry is not just an ontology as a
list of existents, but an ontology with an accompanying ideology. This notion, introduced in
Quine (1951), refers to ‘one’s stock of simple and complex terms or predicates’ (1983, 501),
and concerns what can be expressed in a theory. Alongside the question of what things we say
there are is the question of what notions we need to talk about them.
I anticipate the following response:
“So  what?  Re-phrase  and  say  that  the  target  of  ontological enquiry  is  an
unstructured list of existents. It remains true that the Quinean countenances
possibilities  that  are  absurd,  so their  metaphysics  collapses  by virtue  of  its
reliance on a bad conception of ontology.”
But the introduction of ideology in fact changes things substantially. For the Quinean will
regard ontology and ideology as closely related: there will be no such thing as ontological
enquiry divorced from ideological enquiry because we are constantly engaged in a complex
trade-off between the two.4 Furthermore, this reveals the basic way in which Quineanism is
misrepresented:  the  Quinean  metaphysical  project  is  one  of  explication,  specifically
explication  of  all  of  our  serious  linguistic  behaviour  if  we want  to  be  truly  Quinean.  A
formulation of which Quine approved glosses this as ‘making more exact a vague or not quite
exact  concept  used in  everyday life’ (Carnap 1947,  8);  we are  generally  not  looking for
entities to throw out of our account of the world, we are looking to build an account of the
world as we understand it and seeing what is needed to do so. To reference the now-cliché
Quinean quip, the relevant three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables are not “Are there  Fs?”, but
“What is there?” (Quine 1948) If we imagined the enquirer as starting from an initial point
and introducing language ranging over different kinds of object until able to achieve with
their theory everything that we can in fact achieve now, the question of elimination would not
come up, or at least would be secondary to the constructive project.
Of  course  we should  accept  that  this  does  not  in  fact  go  on  when someone tries  to  do
ontology: we necessarily start by identifying problematic kinds in the theory that we bring to
the table. This might seem to reintroduce eliminativism. However, to see why focussing on
elimination is still misleading, we can turn to the notions of explaining and explaining away.
These are often treated as distinct, and in at least one sense they certainly are. Something
could  be  described  as  having  been  explained  when  that  explanation  is  only  partial;  for
instance my being hungry explains why I’m looking through the fridge even though it is by
no means a complete explanation of my looking through the fridge (I am hungry a lot of the
time, and only most of the time does it result in me rifling through the fridge). On the other
hand, nothing could be regarded as explained away without being completely so. I do not
count as having explained away the ghost at the fairground if I can account for all the spooky
goings-on as actions taken by the nefarious property developer who wants to shut it down
except for the sighting that took place while she was out of town.
However, if we countenance only complete explanations, it is less clear that the two notions
are distinct and for the Quinean their difference is simply one of emphasis. On the project to
eliminate mental entities, Quine writes:
The reduction of the mental to the physical…can be characterized in either of
two ways: as explaining or as explaining away. There is no difference, but the
first phrasing has a gentler ring. To have repudiated the life of the mind seems
harsher than to have  explained it  in physical terms. (1995, 86,  emphasis in
original)
If  explaining  and explaining  away are  in  all  important  respects  equivalent,  focussing  on
elimination is misleading because it privileges a less natural statement of the situation over a
statement in terms congenial to the intuitions informing the triviality argument.
We can now clearly display how the proponent of the triviality argument misrepresents the
Quinean approach in the key cases. Recall Properties: the strategy of the argument seems to
be effective because it challenges the Quinean to deny, or even question, (2), aware that to do
so seems to be to entertain the possibility of the rejection by modus tollens of a Moorean fact.
Suppose that (1) is a Moorean fact. It nonetheless does not follow that the argument shows
the Quinean approach to turn a trivial point into a substantial issue because the Moorean
status of the fact does not fix its analysis. Moore claimed to refute idealism and prove that
there was an external world by appeal to the Moorean fact expressed by “I know that I have
hands,” but while he thought that this established enough for his purposes, he remained ‘very
sceptical as to what, in certain respects, the correct analysis of such propositions is.’ (Moore
1959, §4)
Given therefore  that  things  remain open to  analysis,  there  is  nothing to  prevent  us  from
extending Properties to say:
(3) Properties just are sets.
(4)  Therefore, there are no properties over and above sets.
This is an eliminative argument, assuming that we believe in sets, because we remove the
commitment to any entity beyond a set of objects sharing a feature, but it does not deny the
Moorean fact. By presenting the argument as explaining what numbers are, we preserve the
truth of (2).
The inclusion  of  ideology in our  enquiry  demonstrates  further  how the  question remains
interesting. For an easy example demonstrating its relevance:
Couples
(1) Some couples are closer than others.
(2) Therefore, there are couples.
(3) Couples just are two people satisfying the predicate ‘xx are together’.
(4) Therefore, there are no couples that are not people quantified over plurally.
Whether this is an acceptable argument turns on questions of ideology – if we countenance
both plural and singular quantification, we can account for couples in ideological terms, but if
we do not regard plural quantification as basic a different strategy must be employed. The
proponent  of  the  triviality  argument,  on  the  other  hand,  cannot  avoid  the  ontologically
committing interpretation of “There are couples,” because of their heavyweight interpretation
of the Moorean fact; indeed Fine (2009, 160) endorses this move explicitly. Others might
insist that the above involves no Moorean fact, but it is hard to know how this might be
defended without undermining the Mooreanness of Properties, insofar as both simply appeal
to ordinary language.
A task  remains  for  us,  though:  how  can  we  understand  the  apparent  contrast  between
explaining  and  explaining  away?  On  the  Quinean  picture,  why  would  we  prefer  one
characterisation over the other? The quote above suggested that this question is not worth
asking, but that dismissal is only uncontroversial from within the Quinean framework. In the
face of the external challenge posed by the triviality argument it is important that we say
more to motivate the Quinean view of the relationship between the notions.
Quine is not so helpful in this respect: at least in the above passage he prefers to describe the
physical as explaining the mental, while he describes classes as explaining away the natural
numbers,  but  he dedicates little  space to  justifying the distinction.  The considerations  he
offers relate to the presence of alternative analyses: we have a fairly stable physical story that
purports  to  do  the  explanatory  work  of  the  mental,5 while  numbers  can  be  successfully
equated with various different structures, and distaste for saying that 2 is the class of all pairs
and the class containing exactly 0 and 1 leads him to prefer the eliminative characterisation.
However we can propose a more general reason to choose between the formulations that
demonstrates why the Quinean does not err in considering them more-or-less equivalent.
As mentioned above, the Quinean is engaged in a project of explication: based on core cases
of language-use that we take to be correct, we attempt to clarify what we’re talking about in a
way that goes beyond our mere speech-behaviour. Explication will sometimes achieve results
that are surprising from the standpoint of the defender of a putative kind, and sometimes will
not. In the former situation explaining away is the natural characterisation of a successful
theory, while in the latter it is best seen as merely explaining. For instance, suppose we are
enquiring about universals and we find that the phenomena they were initially employed to
explain are dealt with adequately by the existence of sets. Defenders of universals would
typically say that they believe in universals because without them we cannot make sense of
talk about shared features, so if the phenomena in question (shared features) are adequately
explained by sets it would be strange to retain the term “universal” and say that, as it turns
out,  universals  just  are  sets.  Compare  this  to  an  enquiry  about  properties,  which  is
superficially  very  similar.  In  this  situation,  however,  if  we  were  to  find  that  sets  were
sufficient to explain the phenomena for which properties seemed necessary (again, talk of
shared features), it would be more natural to regard our account as explaining what properties
are because nothing substantial and controversial is associated with the term. It would be a
not  unreasonable  understanding  of  the  concept  property to  hold  it  to  refer  to  whatever
explains the co-attribution of predicates.
The proponent of the triviality argument will perhaps protest that we have not really shown
how the Quinean can have an interesting ontological project. It is not my responsibility to do
so  fully  here,  as  demonstrating  this  would  be  difficult  and  require  that  I  make  further
commitments. My aim has been to show, without relying on any particularly controversial
approach, that one can accept the Moorean facts of the triviality argument without conceding
that the Quinean approach must then fail by treating as questionable that which is certain.
However,  it  has  been  shown,  albeit  briefly,  how  the  Quinean  can  have  an  interesting
ontological  enquiry.  Assuming  a  Moorean  fact  that  says  or  entails  “There  are  Fs,”  the
remainder of the Quinean ontological project becomes relevant to questions about the kind F
when we ask whether there are statements in our prospective theory, Moorean or otherwise,
of the form “There are Gs” such that we could plausibly say “F=G.” To gesture at how the
project will continue we can look to ideology, both in the basic sense above of our accepted
logical  notions  and  in  a  wider  sense.  For  instance,  once  we  have  accepted  “There  are
properties” there remains the question what predicates we accept as applying to those entities:
for instance, should we hold that the predicate “x resides in Platonic heaven” applies to them?
The eliminative extension to Properties would then turn the question about that predicate on
to sets themselves, an example of the interaction of the ontological and ideological projects. I
have not provided details of how one would resolve these further questions, but again that is
not my task here, especially as it could undermine my claim’s neutrality between multiple
approaches to ontology, making the defence less general.
I  conclude that the triviality argument does not show the Quinean approach to be fatally
flawed, even if we grant the assumption that certain key existence-statements are Moorean
facts. The Quinean can, in cases that do not clash with any core usage, regard an account as
merely  explaining  the  entities  involved  by  identifying  them  with  other  entities  or  with
ideological constructions.
Notes
1 Peter van Inwagen (1998, 2009) attempts to articulate the Quinean approach, and some instructive 
explanation can be found in Eklund (2006a, 2006b) and Jenkins (2010), but the sources enjoy only partial 
agreement, and the latter two both acknowledge an unresolved tension with Quine’s work.
2 I have in mind here examples like Eli Hirsch (2005) and Amie Thomasson (2007, 2014), although each of 
their accounts involves substantially more than the triviality argument.
3 For instance, we see claims that the ‘Quinean method is eliminativist by design’ (Schaffer 2009, 372).
4 While Quine (1951) does distinguish the two endeavours, saying that two theories with the same ontology 
may differ in ideology, it is clear even there that they are importantly related.
5 I of course have no stake here in the attempt to explain/repudiate the mental; my point is entirely independent of that
dispute.  Notably  though,  while  Quine  was  optimistic  in  earlier  work  (e.g.,  his  1960)  about  the  prospects  for  this
reduction, in the cited work he acknowledges that it is unsuccessful and acquiesces in anomalous monism.
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